Chapter One: Principles of Self-Defense and Lifesaving Using Lethal Force

Article Summary

Core Halachic Principles

a. The general principle “if one comes to kill you – arise to kill him” means self-defense is permitted and even obligatory.

b. Not only the one in life-threatening danger must save himself, but all people must save others found in perilous situations.

c. Carrying a personal weapon for self-defense is permissible, and at times obligatory, when danger is prevalent.

d. It is prohibited to provide false documentation in order to receive a permit to carry a personal weapon.

Analysis of the Halacha

1. A Time for War and a Time for Peace

The very discussion and analysis around using lethal force for self-defense or deterrence brings about discomfort: There is no need to explain that war in general is not desired according to the Torah. For indeed, even to David, King of Israel, it is stated “you have spilled much blood and conducted grand wars, you shall not build a house in My name” (Divrei HaYamim 1 22:8). Even an altar that was touched by iron was rendered unfit: “the altar was created to increase the lifespan of man and iron to shorten the lifespan of man, it is not permissible to wave the shortener over the lengthener”… this point of incompatibility of the Temple and war acts as a simple explanation for one halacha in the Jerusalem Talmud: “From where do we know that he (=the anointed in battle) can be appointed as High Priest?”… in the Korban HaEdah he writes: “that one would have thought since he is anointed in battle, he is unfit to approach the Tent of Meeting to serve in the Sanctuary in perpetuity” … we hear in this ‘hava amina’ (initial assumption) the echo of God’s words to David.¹

Proof of the moral dilemma of using lethal force even for self-defense can be found in the words of Rashi, who explains Yaakov’s actions according to the Midrash: [Before his confrontation with Esav,] he prepared himself with three things, a gift, prayer, and war.²

This preparation for conflict was not comforting for Yaakov, despite his lack of choice in the matter: ‘And he feared and he was saddened’ – ‘and he feared’ perhaps he would be killed, ‘and he was saddened’ if he would [be forced to] kill others.³

Yaakov was aware of his responsibility for his family’s wellbeing and the fact that defending them would occur through war, and despite this he was disturbed by this approach. There are those who learned the halachic principles of departing to war from the halachot of returning from war and other halachic domains, and there are those who learned this from the fact that the authority to send others to an offensive war (Milchemet Reshut) is granted to the High Court alone, which is obligated to assess the necessity of the war and even limit it,⁴ for war in itself is not a moral act: For unjustified war includes the prohibition of pillaging, murder, robbery, and loss of life itself… and due to this concern it is taught in a Mishnah: “we only send [troops] to an offensive war by order of the court of seventy-one [justices]”, in other words, we require a directive to permit it according to beit din.⁵

These sources were all stated regarding actual cases and draw upon prophetic visions of the End of Days: Thus, [God] will judge among the nations and arbitrate for the many peoples, and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; Nation shall not take up sword against nation; They shall never again know war.⁶

One of the Torah’s purposes is to create social regulation based upon justice and integrity,⁷ and the prophecy of the End of Days is explained accordingly: The Sages said: there is no [difference] between this world and Messianic times except for subservience to [foreign] governments… the Sages and prophets did not desire for the Messianic times to [involve] control over the entire world, to rule over the gentiles, to be exalted by the nations, or to eat, drink, and celebrate. Rather, they desired to be free to involve themselves in Torah and wisdom without any pressures or disturbances… at the same time, there will be no hunger, war, envy, or competition, for good will flow in abundance and all the delights will be freely available like dust, and the entire world would engage only with knowing God, and therefore Israel will be the great sages who know hidden matters and comprehend the mind of their Creator as much as man can, as it is stated “for the land will be filled with devotion to God as water covers the sea” (Yeshayahu 11:9).⁸

Despite this, a saddening fact that one should not ignore is that war and violence are part of reality and we have yet to reach the stage of the End of Days, and there are difficult situations where one must take a violent action against an enemy or another threat to the lives of the collective and the individual, as Shlomo states: There is a time for all objects under the heavens… a time to kill and a time to heal, a time to destroy and a time to build… a time to love and a time to hate, a time of war and a time of peace.⁹

At times, there is no choice but to harm another person, and even if this situation is not ideal, it is an internalization of the reality of the situation: “[I will require a reckoning for human life] of everyone for each other” (Bereishit 9:5) – God explained why a person is punished, when it is appropriate to act with camaraderie. This is not the case in times of war and [during] a time to hate, then it is the time to kill, and there is no penalty for this at all, for this is the foundation of the world… and even the King of Israel is permitted to execute an offensive war, even though some Jews will be killed by this.¹⁰

We are confronted by this complexity already in the times of the Forefathers, and it appears again and again in Tanach regarding the greatest people of our nation. Since the beginning of the days of our forefathers, in contrast to characters such as Yishmael and Esav, whose lives revolved around the worlds of hunting and war and are described as motivated by power and barbarism, the character of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov is presented as a way of life of values and spirituality. Despite this, the story of the forefathers and the greatest people of our nation teach us that avoiding violence is not naivete.

Avraham wages war against the five kings in order to save Lot and his property: And Avram heard that his kin was taken captive, he mustered his trained servants born into his household, numbering three hundred and eighteen, and went in pursuit as far as Dan. He and his servants attacked them at night and defeated them; and he pursued them as far as Chovah, north of Damascus.¹¹

The simple interpretation of the verses is that we are dealing with armed conflict, with an organized military force and wartime tactics. The commentators also explain the verb ‘and he mustered’ (vayerek) as carrying a weapon: Vayerek – as Onkelos translates “and he girded”. Similar to “and I will gird myself with the sword against you” (Vayikra 24:33) and “I will gird on my sword” (Shemot 15:9) and “Gird yourself with the spear and battle axe” (Tehillim 35:3).¹²

This section comes to teach us about the importance of the act of saving others, even if life-threatening and even through war: And this story is written in the Torah to inform [us] of Avraham’s integrity of heart to God and his faith in him wholeheartedly. For he chased after the four kings with few people, and it teaches us that it is proper for man to give himself over to danger in order to save his relative, as Avraham Avinu did.¹³

Furthermore, the first act of Moshe Rabbeinu as an adult that the Torah recounts is the salvation of a beaten Jew by killing an Egyptian: And it was at that time that Moshe grew up and went out to his brethren and saw their suffering, and he saw an Egyptian man hitting a Hebrew man from his brethren. And he looked in both directions and saw that there was no one, and he struck the Egyptian and buried him in the sand.¹⁴

Moshe leads Israel in their wars in the desert and before entering the Land of Israel, and afterwards Yehoshua fights Amalek, bringing the Jewish nation into the land and leading Israel in combat. David fights wars of Israel and praises God in his poetry – “He who teaches my hands to wage war… I will chase my enemies and destroy them, and I will not return until their extermination” (Shmuel II 22:35-38).¹⁵

We also find in the Talmud an encounter where the Sages were forced to take a violent action in order to save one of their colleagues: Rebbe Imi was captured in Safsifa. Rebbe Yonatan said: let the dead be wrapped in their shawl [i.e. we cannot save him, and he has been decreed to die]. Rebbe Shimon Ben Lakish said: even if I should kill or be killed, I will go and save him using force.¹⁶

In truth, self-defense is a fundamental and basic right, for a life where one cannot defend themselves is a reality with no basis: The Torah teaches us that it is permissible for man at all times, and even his sacred obligation, to defend himself… how absurd is the demand that an entire nation be dependent on the good will of others, and lack the capability of self-defense? The dignity of the entire congregation, like the dignity of the individual, is expressed with the possibility to defend his life and honor.¹⁷

This primary analysis of ethical principles supports the halachic discourse regarding the permit to defend oneself, arising from the topics of convicting a murderer and the law of “one who comes through a tunnel”.¹⁸

2. The Universal Prohibition to Kill and the Obligation to Bring a Murderer to Justice

The prohibition “do not murder” is one of the most severe prohibitions in the Torah, of which it is said regarding them “[better to] be killed than to transgress”. The prohibition is listed within the Ten Commandments and is etched into the tablets in an short, unilateral fashion, indicating it as a fundamental principle that requires no explanation or elucidation – “do not murder!”.¹⁹ This foundation was laid down well before the Giving of the Torah as a command to all Noahides – “one who spills the blood of man, by man his blood shall be spilled” (Bereishit 9:6), and the rationale given is due to the Image of God within man – “for in the Image of God did [God] make man” (ibid.). Harm to a person’s life not only affects him but also is an attack on God.²⁰

This is the ruling of the Rambam: Adam HaRishon was commanded six things… against murder.²¹

Anyone who kill a Jewish person violates a negative prohibition, as it is stated “do not murder”.²²

Taking a person’s life is a harsh sin, however the Torah’s engagement with defense against the sin before its execution and in the legal domain afterwards, utilizes the same act – taking the life of the attacker. A murderer who is tried in a beit din is sentenced to death – “the murderer shall surely die” (Bamidbar 35:16-18). The obligation to punish the murder is included in its initial warning – “one who spills the blood of man, by man his blood shall be spilled”, i.e. the obligation of man to kill the murderer.²³

The complexity of using the opportunity to kill a murderer is expressed in the Mishnah in Tractate Makkot, demonstrating how much a beit din must work to avoid killing murderers: A Sanhedrin that kills one [person] in seven years is called a murderous [court]. Rebbe Elazar Ben Azarya said: one in seventy years. Rebbe Tarfon and Rebbe Akiva said: had we been on the Sanhedrin, no person would be killed at all. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: this too [=avoiding the death penalty] increases the number of killers in Israel”.²⁴

One of the goals of punishing the murderer is to deter further cases of murder. The Sages were cautious, seeking to avoid implementing capital punishment, and Rabban Shimon Ben Gamliel expresses his opinion that limiting the death penalty leads to more killing. Even the execution of the wayward and rebellious son (ben sorer u’moreh) is perceived by the Sages as prevention and limitation of future crime.²⁵

Like the obligation to mete out justice after the act, so too the need to protect the individual and society from murderers requires providing the possibility of the defender to make an attempt on the attacker’s life. And thus, like what will be explained in the following section, halacha determines that a person is permitted to defend themselves and save others, even at the price of the attacker’s life.

3. Self-Defense and Saving Others

Every person has the right to defend themselves, and the halachic principle is “if one comes to kill you – rise to kill him”.²⁶ The source for this halachic principle is the halacha of ‘one who comes in a tunnel’ (haba bemachteret):
If one finds a robber in a tunnel [to their home] and strikes them and kills them, he has no blood [on his hands]. If the light shone on him (I.e. he was aware that his life was not at risk), his blood is [on his hands], he shall surely pay. If he does not have [the means to pay], he is sold for the theft.²⁷

The permit to kill the robber is based on the understanding that the robber intended to kill the owner of the house if he resists, and therefore the Torah permits the homeowner to preempt him and attack the robber: Rava said: what is the reason behind the [law of the] tunnel? There is an assumption that a person does not place himself before his money, and this [robber] says to himself, ‘if I go, he will stand against and not let me go, and if he stands against me I will kill him’, and the Torah says, if he comes to kill you, arise to kill him”.²⁸

This law permits killing a person extrajudicially, and thereby creates a frontline tension with the general, universal prohibition of spilling blood. Because of this, Rashi comments that we are dealing with a unique insight that the Torah granted to man: And the Torah says to you, ‘“The wicked and wayward child (ben sorer u’moreh) is judged based on his [inevitable] end” (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:5) and in a baraita in the Babylonian Talmud on site – ‘there is no blood’, and teaches you that since he is coming to kill you, you should arise to kill him.²⁹

This is the ruling in halacha: For one who comes in a tunnel [to another’s home], whether by day or night, he has no blood [=criminality] when the homeowner or any other person kills him is exempt, and every person has the authority to kill him whether on a weekday or Shabbat in any manner of death that he can kill him, as it is stated “he has no blood”. And for what [reason] does the Torah permit the blood of the robber [to be spilled], even though he is coming for his money? Because the assumption is that if the homeowner stood against him and prevent him [from doing so] he would kill him, and it is thus found that one who enters his friend’s home to steal is akin to a pursuer after his friend [with intention] to kill and therefore he should be killed, whether he was an adult or a minor, whether male or female.³⁰

The law of haba bemachteret, according to the Rambam, originates from the law of a murderous pursuer (rodef).³¹ This means that there is not only a permit to defend oneself against attack but a fundamental obligation of every person to save those who are attacked and found in life-threatening situations, even at the cost of killing the attacker.³² For one who pursues his friend to kill him, even if the pursuer was a minor, all Jews are commanded to save the pursued from the hands of the pursuer and even through [taking] the life of the pursuer. How so? If he was warned [of the crime] and was chasing after him, even though he did not receive a warning, since he is still pursuing him, he is [liable] to be killed. If we can save him by [wounding] a limb of the pursuer such as if they struck him with an arrow or stone or sword and amputated his arm or broke his leg or blinded his eye, we do so, and if we are not able to aim and can only save him if we kill the pursuer, they should kill him, and even though he still hasn’t killed [the victim] yet, as it is stated “you shall cut off her hand; show no pity” (Devarim 25:12).³³

Granted, there are differences between the permit of the pursued to save himself and the obligation of another person to save him. As a general rule, the permit of the pursued is broader than the obligation of others. Thus, for example, one who comes to save another must warn the pursuer, yet the one who the pursuer intends to kill is exempt from this principle.³⁴

4. Submitting False Documentation in Order to Receive a License for a Weapon

Carrying a personal weapon is regulated in the State of Israel by the Firearm Law, which determines that carrying a weapon is dependent on fulfillment of basic requirements, criteria, and the submission of a declaration of health ³⁵. One is obligated to listen to this guideline and fill out correct documentation, similar to the obligation according to halacha to follow the rest of the laws of the government. ³⁶

Aside from the obligation to follow the law, there is a prohibition to lie and an obligation to distance oneself from falsehood – “distance yourself from falsehood”.³⁷ Granted, the Sages permitted deviation from the truth when necessary,³⁸ however this permit is very limited and applies only when the deviation from the truth does not harm others.³⁹ In the context of carrying a weapon, the definition of what ‘when necessary’ means is not clear and dependent on many variables, such as the level of necessity of the weapon based on the time and place and the health condition of the person seeking to carry a weapon. The decision of what is necessary is at the level of the collective and the law and not the decision of the individual. Therefore, the individual must provide an accurate declaration form and fulfill the legal criteria, and there is a prohibition of submitting a false declaration in order to receive a license to carry a weapon.⁴⁰

To the next chapter

Shield of Israel – to the home page and table of contents

Notes - הערות שוליים

Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin, War in Light of Halacha (earlier footnote 2), pages 9-10.
Rashi, Bereishit 32:9.
Ibid. 8.
Ido Rechnitz and Eliezer Goldstein, Jewish Military Ethics, Tel Aviv 5773, pages 91-95.
Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin, ibid.
Yeshayahu 2:4.
Rambam, Guide to the Perplexed, section 3, chapter 27.
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim VeMilchamoteihem, chapter 12, halachot 2, 4-5
Kohelet 3:1.
Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berliner, the Emek Davar, Bereishit 9:5. Granted, the words of the Netziv were intended for a generic war and not for the individual, see the expansive discourse of Rabbi Yehuda Kaufman, “Time for War” vs. “Time for Peace” according to the Netziv, Merchavim, 6 (5757), pages 285-297.
Bereishit 14:14-15.
Rashi ibid., and this is also the interpretation of the Ibn Ezra and other commentaries there. In the Midrash we find other interpretations. This is stated in Bereishit Rabba – “Rebbe Yehuda said: they turned (horiku) their faces against Avraham. They said, the five kings could not [overcome] them and we can withstand them. Rebbe Nechemiah said: [Avraham] turned his face against them. He said, I will depart and fall [in battle] to sanctify the name of the Holy One, Blessed Be He. Rebbe Abba Bar Zavda said: he turned toward them with weapons, similar to what is said ‘Ready (veharek) the spear and javelin against my pursuers; tell me I am your deliverance’ (Tehillim 35:3). Rebbe Shimon Ben Lakish said: he turned to them with precious stones and pearls, similar to what is said ‘in fine gold (biyerakrak)’ (Tehillim 68:14). Rebbe Levi said: he turned to them [to embolden them according to the Torah] portion of officials, similar to what is said, ‘is there a person who is fearful or disheartened?’ (Devarim 20:8)” (Bereishit Rabba, Parsha 42. The Midrash later on explains additional aspects of the war as miracles and not as normal military action). Rashi’s and other commentaries’ choices to use specifically the interpretation of Rebbe Abba Bar Zavda which explains ‘vayerek’ as departure to armed conflict teaches us that in his eyes this is the additional value that this Torah section is intending to teach.
Radak, Bereishit 14:1; see further the commentary of the Malbim and Kli Yakar there. Avraham’s departure to a war of rescue stands out on the backdrop of the war of the other kings, which was for the sake of acquisition of land and increasing the number of slaves, see the expanded discourse of Amos Geula, ‘The Story of the War of Kings and its Direction’, Ma’aliyot, 16 (5755), pages 153-157.
Shemot 2:11-12, see the Malbim there – “and do not say that he did this without foresight, only out of sudden anger and that this is unpraiseworthy… for he did this with patience and through consultation of his mental faculties… he struck him to save his brother’s life”. One should note that the Midrash Tanchuma (Shemot 10) saying that Moshe killed an Egyptian utilizing the ineffable name of God (and this is also Rashi’s commentary on the verse) minimizes the principle of war in Moshe’s act. See Avigdor Shenan, ‘Between Kiddush Hashem and Court Execution’, from: Y. Gafni and A. Revitsky (editors), The Sanctity of Life and Anguish, Jerusalem 5753, pages 66-68. Shenan shows how Midrashim from the Amoraic period have a tendency to downplay the principle of physical combat as a practical message to their generation who suffered under the yoke of occupiers.
Shmuel also completes that which King Shaul did not do and kill Agag himself (Shmuel I 15:32-33). Granted, we are not dealing with self-defense in this case, but the fulfilment of the commandment to wipe out Amalek, but the fulfilment of this action by a prophet and Jewish leader is worth mentioning. For expanded discourse on war and peace in Tanach, see Yehuda Elitzur, Israel and the Bible, Ramat Gan 5760, pages 305-312.
Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot 8:4. See Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun, From the Hiding Place of Your Torah – from the Torah of the Land of Israel, Alon Shvut 5783, pages 304-322, who find in this account (together with additional sources in the Talmud) proof of tension between the Sages regarding the question of military force on the backdrop of anarchy in the Roman Empire at the time.
Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, Words of Thought and Consideration (earlier footnote 3), pages 27-28. This principle is expressed in Israeli law and anchored to the basic law: Human Dignity and Liberty, articles 2 and 4.
For expanded discourse regarding the Sages’ perception of war and peace, see Rabbi Shimon Gershon Rosenberg, My Covenant is Peace – Right and Left, War and Peace, Rishon Letzion 5780, pages 264-305; Rabbi Yehuda Shaviv, ‘The War of Torah At War’, from: Ethics During the Trial of War, Jerusalem 5745, pages 54-70; Rabbi Yaakov Medan, War as a Spiritual Phenomenon in the World: A Spiritual Limb or a Nuisance, ibid., pages 91-143; Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, ‘Questions About Wartime Morality’, Tzohar, 11 (5762), pages 64-71; Rabbi Yaakov Rones, ‘On the Morality of War in Halachic Literature in the 20th Century – Morality, Halacha, and Nationalism’, from: M. Rachimi (editor), Amdut – Nation, State, and Torah, volume 1, Elkanah and Rechovot 5770, pages 175-197.
The Gemara views the prohibition of murder as a halacha learned from logical inference, as an obvious, logical, and clear moral principle, see Sanhedrin 74a: “Rebbe Yochanan says in the name of Rebbe Shimon Ben Yehotzadak, they counted [the votes] and concluded in the attic of the house of Nitzah in Lod: [regarding] all sins in the Torah, if [assailants] say to a person ‘transgress and you will not be killed’ – he should transgress and not be killed, aside from idol worship, forbidden relationships, and murder… from where do we know [this principle] in regards to a murderer? It is through logical inference, for there was [a person] who came in front of Rabba and said to him: the leader of my living place told me ‘kill this person and if you do not, I will kill you’. He said to him: he should kill you and you should not kill; who will say that your blood is redder? Perhaps the blood of this person is redder!”. According to Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook, this logical inference has absolute power: even in situations where it seems to a person that “his blood is redder than his friend’s blood”, such as when his friend is terminally ill, there is no permit to kill, for the prohibition of murder is an absolute prohibition that is not pushed aside under any circumstances. See his writing in the Mishpat Kohen Responsa, article 143.
See the commentary of the Ramban, Shemot 20:12, as well: “do not murder… behold, I have commanded you to acknowledge that I created all in heart and in practice, and to respect elders for they are partners in creation. If so, be careful lest you harm a work of My hands and spill blood of man that I created for My honor and to give thanks to me for all of these”. From the words of the Ramban, the Avnei Nezer Responsa, Choshen Mishpat, article 2 learns – “behold, murder is a prohibition between man and God”.
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim, chapter 9, halacha 1.
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Rotzeach VeShmirat HaNefesh, chapter 1, halacha 1. We chose to bring the two sources of the Rambam, both the prohibition to kill for a Noahide and the prohibition of murder, for despite the fact that the Achronim disagree whether a Jew is considered obligated in Noahide commandments, regarding the prohibition of murder, it arises from the wording of the Rambam in Hilchot Rotzeach VeShmirat HaNefesh, chapter 1, halacha 2, that the obligation is twofold – a Jew is cautioned for the prohibition of spilling blood like a Noahide, and in tandem for the prohibition of murder in all of its details and delineations as an additional prohibition.
This is how Onkelos translates the phrase – “the judge’s verdict is his blood will be spilled”; it is also Rashi’s interpretation that the expression “by man his blood will be spilled” means that the obligation is placed upon the judges to kill him, when there are witnesses and he was warned in advance, and that which is stated in the previous verse that God will seek him out is in situations without witnesses.
Mishnah, Makkot 1:10.
“The wayward and rebellious child (ben sorer u’moreh) is judged based on his [inevitable] end” (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:5) and in a baraita in the Babylonian Talmud on site – “The Torah reached the final mentality of the ben sorer u’moreh… and he will go out to the crossroads and rob people. The Torah says: he should die innocent and not die guilty” (Sanhedrin 72a). Despite this, the Oral Torah limits the opportunity of implementing this law, to the point where the Sages say – “it never was and never will be. Why was it written? Expound it and receive reward” (ibid. 71a). Even so, halacha moves on the axis between the obligation to prevent future crime and each person’s right to live.
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 72a, Berachot 62b, and more.
Shemot 22:1-2
Sanhedrin 72a. In Bamidbar Rabba, article 4 it is stated – “cause sorrow to the Midianites” why? “because they cause sorrow to you’. From here the Sages said one who comes to kill you, arise to kill him. The Midrash expounds the principle “one who comes to kill you, arise ot kill him” in the context of a nationwide war, and in the Gemara this principle has its source in self-defense of the individual.
Rashi, Sanhedrin 72a, ד”ה חזקה
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Geneiva, chapter 9, halacha 7, 9. He explains the rationale behind the permit to kill the robber as due to the robber bringing himself to a state of “having no blood” –“he is thus as if he was dead from the onset” (Rashi, Shemot 22:1), “he is thus to you as one who has no blood and soul and is permissible to kill” (Rashi, Sanhedrin 72a). The Rambam, to contrast, emphasizes the lifesaving of the pursued by the robber who is pursuing him. See Aharon Anker, Principles in Hebraic Criminal Law, 5767, pages 320-364, 387-388.
For analysis of the relationship between rodef and haba bemachteret, see Rabbi Yehuda Zolden, The Kingdoms of Judah and Israel, Shapira Center 5762, page 284-304; Rabbi Moshe Nakash, ‘Is the Permit to Kill a Robber Coming Through a Tunnel Applicable Nowadays?’, HaMa’ayan 47:3, (Nissan 5767), pages 9-19; Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham, ‘Killing a Robber for the Sake of Property Defense’, Techumin, 28 (5768), pages 174-192.
See Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, Words of Thought and Consideration (earlier footnote 3), page 27, who innovates that the principle of self-defense in the halacha of haba bemachteret is not only for risk to life, but also the right to protect one’s personal property.
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Rotzeach, chapter 1, halacha 6-7. According to the Rambam there, included within this obligation is the positive commandment to “cut off her hand” (in other words, the hand of the attacker, when there is a need to save the pursued, as well as any other limb, and even taking the life of the attacker is included within this mitzvah.
The Rivash (Rivash Responsa, article 238) writes that the pursued does not need to warn the pursuer because he is afraid for his life, however another person who comes to save him must provide warning if possible. The Mishneh LaMelech (Hilchot Chovel U’Mazik, chapter 8, halacha 10) adds in the name of the Rivash that it is specifically the person coming to save the pursued that must try to save him by neutralizing the pursuer in a limb, if possible, but the pursued is allowed to kill even if he could be saved through neutralization. Granted, the Minchat Chinuch (article 600:7) writes that many disagree with him on this. Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook (Mishpat Kohen Responsa, article 139) writes that the foundation of this division is that, for the pursued, the Torah defined the pursuer as “having no blood”, and the prohibition to kill is entirely removed, however for another person, the prohibition to kill is pushed aside due to the pikuach nefesh element of the pursued, and when it is possible to save him using neutralization the prohibition is not pushed aside. The principles of the law of the rodef and the mitzvah of “do not stand idly by your friend’s blood” influenced Israeli law: the obligation to save a person in need is anchored in Israeli law in the “Do Not Stand Idly By Your Friend’s Blood Law – 5758-1998”. Before this law was passed, the law did not relate to the obligation to save others, rather determining that a person does not carry criminal responsibility for an act that required immediate action to prevent an attack (this is wording of the law – “a person does not carry criminal responsibility for an act that would have required immediate intervention in order to repel an unlawful attack that posed tangible danger of harm to life, freedom, body, or property, [whether] his or another’s” – penal code, 5737 – 1977, article 34j). The “Do Not Stand Idly By Your Friend’s Blood” Law determined, in line with the biblical commandment, that a person who can save another is obligated to do so (see Neil Hendel, “Do Not Stand Idly By Your Friend’s Blood Law – 5758-1998: Inspiration and Reality’, Legal Research 16 [5761], pages 229-275; Michael Wigoda, ‘The Obligation of Life-Saving and its Limitations – Do Not Stand Idly By Your Friend’s Blood’, Parshat HaShavua – Ministry of Law, Parshat Achrei Mot-Kedoshim 5761, 24th edition; Rabbi Dr. Mordechai Halperin, ‘Do Not Stand Idly By Your Friend’s Blood – Halacha and Law’, Assia books, 10 [5768], pages 12-15).
Firearm Law 5709-1949, articles 4-5. Criteria for Granting a License to Carry a Personal Firearm – https://www.gov.il/he/pages/criteria_for
The halachic relevance of state legislation through the power of ‘Dina DeMalchuta Dina’, king’s decrees, or community edicts, is discussed at length in the words of the authorities in recent generations and in many essays. We will mention here two essays from past years: Rabbi Ido Rechnitz, Position Paper #17 – ‘the Status of the Laws of the State and Court Rulings’, Aretz Legal Institute, Shvat 5782 https://bit.ly/4sh0ous; Rabbi Uri Sadan, ‘The Halachic Status of the Laws of the State of Israel’, Shvat 5784, https://bit.ly/4rL4Lyd.
Shemot 23:7.
Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 65b; Bava Metzia 23b-24a.
As the Ben Ish Chai writes after bringing many examples from the Talmud of statements that are untrue – “however, place the fear of God on your faces, lest you utter sounds that are unbecoming using tight [restriction on] imagination. One should also ensure they are learning from the manner in which the prohibition is delineated” (Torah LiShma Responsa, article 364). See Rabbi Cherlow, ‘Distance Yourself from Falsehood’, Tzohar, 1 (5760), pages 13-24, https://bit.ly/3qVLkVa; that which we have written in the compilation ‘Tzohar Ad 120’, chapter 17, https://bit.ly/3MPZvtY; and the position paper ‘Telling the Truth to a Patient Regarding their Medical Condition’, https://bit.ly/3tAWQb0.
Compare this to the responsum of Rabbi Ariel Bareli regarding a notary’s signature on an imprecise declaration (which seemingly was signed in front of him), https://bit.ly/400MGzY. According to him, even though it is appropriate to distance oneself from signing for faulty wording, when this does not harm others, and when it is acceptable to do so, there is no prohibition. He relies on the explanation of the Taz for the permit to say ‘a beautiful and pious bride’ untruthfully – “there is a prevailing custom familiar to all people that when one makes a bad purchase, those who see it praise it in front of [the buyer] so he does not experience distress, and if so, then so too here the entire world will certainly understand that the piety stated is in the eyes of her groom [and not necessarily objective beauty]” (Taz, Even HaEzer, article 65, subarticle 1). According to this, even regarding the signature of a notary on a guarantee, one can say that this means the client desires this, even if he is not present. Rabbi Uri Sadan (earlier footnote 46) also discusses “cutting corners” and the question of whether there is an obligation to follow the ‘dina demalchuta’ in a place where the government chooses not to enforce the law. Both of them rely on the opinion of Rabbi Dov Lior, that there is no obligation to obey the law in this case. However, it seems that regarding our case, receiving a license for a weapon against protocol is not “a negligible act that does not lead to harm” (in the words of Rabbi Bareli there), and it can even harm others, since there is danger in an unqualified person carrying a weapon. Therefore, even though many do so, they are violating a prohibition and “it is better for me to be called a fool all my life and not become a wicked person for one moment in front of God” (Mishnah Eduyot 5:6).