Article Summary

Core Halachic Principles

a. A weapon is considered an item with a permissible use on shabbat (kli shemelachto leheter). According to those who are stringent – it is an item with a prohibited use on shabbat (kli shemelachto leissur), which is permissible to carry for its own sake or if one requires the surface it rests on.

b. It is permissible for any person to carry a weapon and ammunition cartridges on Shabbat wherever there is an eiruv. It is permissible to carry it during guard hours and in times of danger, as well as routinely for those who carry a weapon during the week.

c. According to many authorities, carrying a weapon in a location that does not have an eiruv (in public domain) is a biblical prohibition. In a situation where there is pikuach nefesh this is permissible, however if one can avoid going out with a weapon – they should do so.

d. If there is an extraordinary need, one can rely on the opinions of the authorities who are lenient for a soldier and security official alone to leave the eiruv boundaries with a weapon even when there is no present danger.

e. It is permissible to carry the weapon license in places with an eiruv. When there is an extraordinary need, it is permissible to carry the certificate in an irregular fashion (using a shinui), such as between one’s clothes and body, in a sock or shoe, even in places with no eiruv.

f. One should not train with nor clean a weapon on Shabbat unless there is an immediate need of pikuach nefesh.

Analysis of the Halacha

1.Muktzeh

Regarding the definition of a weapon as an object set aside on Shabbat (muktzeh), one should differentiate between three types of items:

1. An item with a permissible use on Shabbat (kli shemelachto leheter). This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch:

An item with a permissible use on shabbat is permissible to be carried, even if only for the sake of the item perhaps it will break or be stolen; however, for no reason whatsoever, it is prohibited to move.1

2. An item with a prohibited use on Shabbat (kli shemelachto leissur). This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch: An item with a prohibited use on shabbat is permissible to move for its use, such as the hammer of a goldsmith or blacksmith to crack open walnuts or an axe to cut dates; [one is also permitted to move it] for its location, i.e. when one requires the place that the item is situated upon, and it is permissible to take it from there and place it wherever he wishes. However, [moving the item] from the sun to shade, i.e. when he only needs to move it because he fears it will be broken or stolen, is prohibited.2

A kli shemelachto leissur is an item whose primary use is for actions prohibited on Shabbat. It is permissible to move it for itself, i.e. for permissible use of the item, or for its location, but one should not move the item to protect it, such as bringing it from the sun to the shade or moving it to ensure it does not get stolen.

3. Items of monetary loss (muktzeh mechmat chesron kis). This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch:

All items can be moved on Shabbat aside from items of great value, such as a knife used for ritual slaughter or circumcision, a haircutter’s scissors, and the knife used by scribes to sharpen quills. Because they are careful not to use [these items] for other purposes, it is prohibited to carry them on Shabbat, even for its location or its use.3

Muktzeh mechmat chesron kis is a kli shemelachto leissur4 that, due to its value and the concern that it be damaged, people do not use it for other purposes. It is treated more stringently than kli shemelachto leissur and it is prohibited to carry it even for permissible use on Shabbat or for the use of its location.

Granted, a firearm is an item used for shooting, which is prohibited on Shabbat for igniting a flame (mav’ir) as well as “loss of life” (a prohibition including injury),5 however a no less important use of a weapon is deterrence. In practice, the majority of the time a weapon is a means of deterrence, and only on occasion is it used for shooting. Therefore, one should evaluate whether a firearm is an item of permissible or prohibited use on Shabbat, and if its use is prohibited, whether one should define it as an item that people do not use for other purposes.

The Mishnah in Shabbat deals with the prohibition of taking military equipment into public domain:

Man should not go out with a sword, bow, shield, club, or spear [on Shabbat], and if he went out, he is liable [to bring] a sin offering. Rebbe Eliezer says: [these items] are adornment for him.6

The Mishnah does not discuss the question of whether the items are muktzeh or not. Rabbi Yaakov Emden in his commentary on the Mishnah writes:

Rebbe Eliezer says they are an adornment for him. It is obvious that Rebbe Eliezer does not argue that they are muktzeh, for their [primary] use is prohibited [on Shabbat] and they possess [qualities] of muktzeh mechmat chesron kis. This is similar to [haircutter’s] scissors and the like. He instead disagrees regarding the liability for a sin offering alone.7

According to Rabbi Yaakov Emden, weapons are considered items that one would not use for a different purpose. They are muktzeh mechmat chesron kis, and even Rebbe Eliezer, who permits taking the weapons into public domain, prohibits carrying them due to the laws of muktzeh.

However, many authorities disagree with his opinion. In the Divrei Yatziv Responsa, in a responsum discussing carrying weapons on Shabbat, he disagrees with him and writes that these items are not maintained as carefully and are not muktzeh mechmat chesron kis. It is possible, according to him, that Rabbi Yaakov Emden meant only to differentiate between the items listed in the Mishnah, which easily deteriorate and require more care, and other items.8

Rabbi Avraham Moshe Avidan writes in the name of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv that in contrast to a circumcision knife, which is placed in a special location when not in use, the central use of a weapon is in its carrying, and therefore man does not worry about carrying it and it is not muktzeh mechmat chesron kis.9

Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Meir writes that people use weapons for other purposes, like opening bottles etc., and therefore it is not considered an item that one is careful with and is not muktzeh mechmat chesron kis.10

Amongst those who hold that a weapon is not muktzeh mechmat chesron kis there is disagreement whether it is a kli shemelachto leissur or leheter. There are those who hold that it is a kli shemelachto leissur. This is what Rabbi Avraham Moshe Avidan writes in the name of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, since the primary use of a weapon is prohibited on Shabbat, and this is also the opinion of Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, etc.11

However, there are those who are more lenient and believe that a weapon is a kli shemelachto leheter or a kli shemelachto leissur velaheter. Rabbi Shlomo Goren writes that it is a kli shemelachto leheter because its use is shooting in dangerous situations, and this is permissible on Shabbat.12 Other authorities write that the primary use of a weapon is for deterrence, and this is not prohibited, therefore it is considered a kli shemelachto leheter.13

It seems that especially in a civilian context, deterrence is its primary use, and the prevailing belief according to Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and those who hold like him is that a weapon is a kli shemelachto leheter. Even according to those who prohibit this, carrying a weapon for guard duty and in order to feel safe is permissible, since it is considered a need in its own right, and one may even move it so that it does not get stolen, which is generally prohibited regarding kli shemelachto leissur; this is permissible because it has an element of pikuach nefesh.14

2.Carrying the Weapon in a Karmelit and in the Public Domain

The Shulchan Aruch rules that a weapon is not considered “attire” and therefore one who carries a weapon in public domain violates a biblical prohibition: Anyone who brings an object [from private domain] that is not used for adornment nor as attire and brings it out in the manner that [people] generally do, is liable… therefore, man should not go out with a sword, bow, shield, club, or spear [on Shabbat], and if he went out, he is liable [to bring] a sin offering.15

The Aruch HaShulchan writes that this all refers to a normal person, however for one who is “a person of war” (such as a soldier, police officer, and any security personnel nowadays), the weapon is considered part of their clothing and permissible to carry: And the reason for this is because these objects are not used for adornment in and of themselves, yet for people of war, they are like his clothing. However, for a normal person they are considered to be a burdened load… and therefore for a person of war, like one who works for the king’s army, they are akin to his clothes.16

Rabbi Shlomo Goren holds like the Aruch HaShulchan, and according to him a soldier may carry a weapon on his person in public domain and a civilian cannot.17 However, the majority of authorities disagree with the Aruch HaShulchan, and according to them a weapon is not considered attire for anyone aside from a soldier or police officer. Since the argument relates to a biblical prohibition, one should only rely on the Aruch HaShulchan’s opinion in a time of extenuating circumstances18.

3.Pikuach Nefesh – Carrying a Weapon in Definite or Potentially Life-Threatening Circumstances

The topic of saving a life (pikuach nefesh) is one of the most impactful in Talmud and halacha. The core aspect of our discussion is not in situations of definite threat to life, where it is clear that one is obligated to carry a weapon, rather carrying of a weapon in routine life when it is not clear-cut whether there is a danger, or when there is no option to leave the weapon in a secure place at home as required by law. The topic has been discussed ad nauseum, therefore we will bring that which is relevant to the issue at hand alone. The primary source for the idea of pikuach nefesh is a discussion in Tractate Yoma: Rebbe Mattye Ben Charash said further: for one who is experiencing a throat illness, we may pour a salve into his mouth on Shabbat, because it is potentially life-threatening, and any potential threat to life pushes Shabbat aside.19 We engage in lifesaving [activities] on Shabbat, and one who is vigilant is praiseworthy, and one does not need to seek permission from the court [to violate a prohibition in order to save a life] … Shmuel says: we do not follow the majority [of cases when it comes to] lifesaving… From where do we know that pikuach nefesh displaces Shabbat?… Shmuel says: “and you shall live by them” (Vayikra 18:5) and not die by them.20

The core principles of this discussion are all brought down as halacha,21 however we must be careful when we endeavor to define what definite and potential pikuach nefesh is, as the Chazon Ish writes: One requires extreme caution when permitting pikuach nefesh in matters that are not direct pikuach nefesh but [threat to life] in the future. If we try to overcompensate, all stores in the lands of the Diaspora will remain open on Shabbat, claiming that they will lose all their income and reach a life-threatening state, and one must consider [whether a situation is life-threatening] with scales of justice. And in general, if the case leads to nullification of Shabbat, it will be akin to a desecration of God’s name, and desecration of God’s name is included within the halachot that one should be killed for rather than violate, and this must also be considered.22

Therefore, one should consider carefully what the definition of pikuach nefesh and its doubtful state regarding the matter of carrying a weapon on Shabbat. Most of the discussions in the Talmud and works of responsa are for events and cases where the danger was clear and immediate, and it is difficult to extrapolate what aspects apply to one’s personal security. According to some of the authorities, only immediate threats are considered pikuach nefesh: There are those who write that for anything that does not involve risk now, even if it can reach a life-threatening state [later], we only violate rabbinic edicts but not biblical prohibitions.23

According to this principle, Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenburg defined two fundamental criteria for the classification of pikuach nefesh: When does the halacha of pikuach nefesh deviate from [the default notion] that we go after the majority [of cases]? When the life-threatening matter is active before us in a tangible way, and this is the understanding of the Jewish person being threatened of whom we have an obligation to violate Shabbat in order to save. However, [for] any [case] that is missing one of these two conditions, the halacha of pikuach nefesh does not deviate from the rest of the halachic principles of the Torah where we follow the majority and are not concerned with the minority, considering it as if it does not [exist]… for this was the intention of Rabbeinu Yerucham in Nativ 12, part 9 brought in the Beit Yosef… I.e. that which is written [by Rabbeinu Yerucham] “if it can reach [a life-threatening state]”, meant according to the concern for the minority [of cases]. Therefore, considering the matter that can reach a life-threatening state is not currently present, and considering that most likely this will not occur, therefore the minority that one could consider is nullified by the majority according to halacha and it is as if it does not [exist].24

According to this definition, it seems at first glance that there is no permit to carry a weapon on Shabbat unless we are in a time of heightened tensions and in locations with high incidence of security events, and even there, if there is military presence it would be seemingly prohibited to violate even a rabbinic prohibition, all the more so in areas where there is no danger.

However, the words of these authorities are explained differently by the Chazon Ish: In the Pitchei Teshuva in the name of the Noda BeYehuda and Chatam Sofer, [it is stated] that if there is a sick person before us, it is permissible to mutilate them for the sake of pikuach nefesh, however if there is no sick person before us, it is prohibited. And the differentiation is not [whether] there is someone before us or not, rather if the issue is common… for we do not make weapons in times of peace, for if so, you have nullified all mitzvot!… rather, future matters that have no semblance in the present are not referred to as potential pikuach nefesh. And in truth, we are not experts in prediction and oftentimes that which we have assessed as lifesaving becomes an obstacle, and therefore we do not render halacha for distant futures.25

According to him, the differentiation is not between the current situation and its future outcomes, but between a common danger and an uncommon one: a hazard of which its statistical probability of occurrence is too low, “and there is no semblance” in his words, is not considered pikuach nefesh. However, a hazard with a relative probability – ‘there is a semblance’ – is considered pikuach nefesh. This principle is thus quantifiable, what “has no semblance’ and what is more common?

It seems that for this matter it is fitting to quote the opinion of the Shmirat Shabbat KeHilchata: Many and diverse are the situations that emergency states can bring with them, and it is impossible to predict them in advance. There are certain matters which are prohibited to perform and there are circumstances that permit and obligate its performance.26

To our detriment, in the current state of the Land of Israel, there is concern for terror attacks at all times and in all places.27 The discussion in Eiruvin relates to this type of reality: Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rav: [regarding] gentiles who cause hardships to Jewish cities – we do not go out against them with weapons and we do not violate the Shabbat for them… when is this stated? When they come for monetary purposes. However, if they came to kill – we go out against them with weapons and violate the Shabbat for them. And in a city close to the border, even if they only come for straw and hay and not to kill – we go out with weapons and violate the Shabbat for them.28

This is the ruling of the Rambam, who adds that we are not dealing only with pikuach nefesh of the masses and cities close to the border, but also for an individual pursued by non-jews in all aspects: Regarding gentiles who cause hardships to Jewish cities, if they came for monetary purposes, we do not violate the Shabbat for them… and in a city close to the border, even if they only come for straw and hay, we depart with weapons and violate the Shabbat for them. And in all situations, if they came to kill or wage war or caused suffering for no purpose, we depart against them with weapons and violate the Shabbat for them… and even a individual pursued by gentiles or by a snake or bear that is pursuing him to kill him, we are commanded to save him, and even through the performance of a number of melachot on Shabbat, and even the fashioning of weapons to save him is permissible.29

This halacha is brought down verbatim in the words of the authorities.30 The Or Zarua makes two fundamental points that are relevant to our case: Our Sages permitted extinguishing a fire on Shabbat, for we live amongst the gentiles and when there is a fire, they come and pillage and kill, and this is no less than [the Talmudic case of] a city near the border for which we violate the Shabbat, therefore it is permissible.31 All the more so now that we live amongst them, that even if they only come to pillage, we may depart against them on Shabbat with weapons, for when they pillage they also kill, and one should not differentiate between [a case] where they caused suffering to say that they are going to come pillage, but when the rumor spreads that they wish to pillage even though they have not come yet, it is permissible to wear weapons to protect and make known in the city so that they do not come, for we do not split hairs for pikuach nefesh.32

From the two points of the Or Zarua, it seems clear that threats of terror are considered, ‘going to come’, and in addition had our enemies known that if they wish to harm us on Shabbat we would not protect ourselves, similar to how we wouldn’t extinguish a flame, it is clear that they would come to kill us. As Rabbi Yisrael Rosen summarizes the opinion of Rabbi Shlomo Goren on the topic: The permit to violate Shabbat that is stated in the Baraita is not one of pikuach nefesh directly before us and this is included within it. At the individual, personal level, a speculative danger such as this cannot act as a satisfactory cause for violating the Shabbat. This halacha of “gentiles who cause suffering” is a fundamental halacha in communal halacha, and we learn from it that in the national context, even distant concern of danger from gentiles displaces the Shabbat. The words “city near a border” mentioned in the Baraita are codewords for security concerns. In nowadays terminology: the risk of terror attacks.33

4.Ammunition Cartridges – Carrying a Weapon Without a Magazine and Carrying a Magazine Separately

The same authorities who discuss the matter of muktzeh for a weapon discuss the issue of carrying an ammunition cartridge as well – should one carry the weapon with or without the magazine, and is it permissible to carry the magazine independently? Rabbi Avraham Moshe Avidan writes in the name of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv that even though some say a weapon without a magazine is not considered an item, one should not be concerned for this.34 The method of use and carrying of a weapon is at times without a magazine and at times with, and in both forms it is considered a complete item. Even an ammunition cartridge with no weapon is considered, as elucidated there, a weapon.

Carrying a magazine alone, inserted into the weapon, or carrying an additional cartridge is a safety and security issue more than a halachic issue for Shabbat, and one should act in this matter (regarding carrying muktzeh items and carrying through a karmelit and public domain) according to the law and guidelines.

5.Carrying a Weapons Permit

Carrying a Weapons Permit One who carries a weapon is bound by law to carry their weapons license with them, and there are locations where one cannot enter without presenting a license. When carrying the license one must discuss two issues – muktzeh and carrying in a place with an eiruv, as well as carrying outside of an eiruv.

Muktzeh According to the Chazon Ish, even a kli shemelachto leheter that has a designated location because of its value is muktzeh mechmat chesron kis.35 According to this methodology, one should not carry an ID, passport, and the like.36 However, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef rules that muktzeh mechmat chesron kis does not apply to items that are keilim shemelachtam leheter.37 Therefore, in a place with an eiruv, one is permitted to carry a weapons license.38

Carrying in a Karmelit and in the Public Domain It is prohibited to carry in a place without an eiruv, however the Shulchan Aruch rules that when there is an extraordinary need and it is for the sake of a mitzvah, it is permissible to tell a gentile to perform a rabbinically forbidden melacha, for it is a shvut deshvut (= two rabbinical prohibitions overlapping each other).39 Following this, there are those who permit shvut deshvut when necessary, even without a gentile.40 Therefore, when there is an extraordinary need, it is permissible to carry a weapons license in a karmelit using a deviated carry technique (shinui), such as between one’s clothing and body or in their sock or shoe.41

6.Firearm Maintenance and Training

Maintaining proper weapon operations requires routine cleaning. Cleaning the firearm involves Shabbat prohibitions, such as disassembly and reconstruction,42 as well as the concern for squeezing the oil when lubricating the weapon. Generally, there is no need to clean one’s weapon daily, and therefore one should clean it on other days or soon before the onset or after the conclusion of Shabbat. In a life-threatening situation, when there is concern for the weapon’s operability, one should maintain it while decreasing the number of prohibitions. It is preferrable, for example, to lubricate the weapon by dripping oil onto it and not via a cloth.43

Even the training required for proficient use of a personal firearm in the civilian arena is not a daily need, and one should not perform it on Shabbat.

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Notes - הערות שוליים

  1. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 308:4.
  2. Ibid. 3.
  3. Ibid. 1.
  4. There are those who hold that even a kli shemelachto leheter is prohibited to move if one designates a specific place for it due to its high value. See later on in footnote 122.
  5. For a discussion regarding the prohibited status of shooting a gun on shabbat, see Rabbi Ezra Bick, https://bit.ly/4dncw91
  6. Mishneh, Shabbat 6:4. The issue of carrying in public domain will be discussed later on.
  7. Peirush Lechem Shamayim, Mishneh LaLechem, Shabbat 6:4.
  8. Divrei Yatziv Responsa, Orach Chaim, article 148.
  9. Rabbi Avraham Moshe Avidan, Shabbat and Moadim in the IDF, Jerusalem 5750, pages 130-136.
  10. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Meir, ‘Are Weapons Muktzeh on Shabbat?’, Techumin 7 (5746), pages 174-177.
  11. Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, HaMorim BaKeshet, page 42; Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, Collection of Responsa, volume 3, article 51 and volume 5, article 49; Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, BaOhala Shel Torah, 2:32; Rabbi Zechariah Ben Shlomo (earlier footnote 85), pages 304-308.
  12. Rabbi Shlomo Goren, Meishiv Milchama Responsa, Jerusalem 5779, volume 2, article 61, pages 46-52. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Meir (earlier footnote 97), footnote 11, is perplexed by his opinion, since according to this logic, even a circumcision knife should be considered a kli shemelachto leheter, for its use for circumcision on Shabbat is permitted. Rabbi Zechariah Ben Shlomo (see previous footnote) disagrees both with the reasoning of Rabbi Shlomo Goren and Rabbi M Ben Meir that is escalated later on.
  13. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Meir, ibid; aforementioned Divrei Yatziv Responsa; this is also implied from the wording of Rabbi Shneor Zalman Auerbach, brought in the Shmirat Shabbat KeHilchata, chapter 220, footnote 28, and this is also written by the Shulchan Shlomo, article 308, subarticle 16, 27. This is also written by Rabbi Ezra Bick (earlier footnote 92) for the sake of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, see the discussion there regarding the status of deterrence as a defining factor for item classification, see HaMorim BaKeshet (earlier footnote 98) in the name of Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl “that weapons are considered kli shemelachto leheter when it is not wartime – its primary use is deterrence”. Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, ibid., disagrees with this reasoning and writes that the entire deterring power of the rifle is that it can be fired and kill others, and its use for deterrence does not define it as a kli shemelachto leheter.
  14. See the aforementioned sources. Rabbi Yaakov Ariel writes that only a person who is in a security position and knows how to use a gun may carry one, however he adds that when there are guidelines that anyone who has a weapon must carry it at all times due to threat – anyone who walks around with a gun during the week and knows how to use it is allowed to carry it on Shabbat. It seems according to this that in the current reality, all gun owners may carry it on Shabbat, even according to those who hold that it is a kli shemelachto leissur. Rabbi Zechariah Ben Shlomo, following his methodology that weapons are a kli shemelachto leissur, writes that carrying a weapon for oneself is permitted only if they know how to use it and not for a new recruit who is still not proficient in its use. However, he is lenient for going to prayer service when there is no other option.
  15. Orach Chaim 301:7.
  16. Aruch HaShulchan, ibid., article 51.
  17. Meishiv Milchama Responsa (earlier footnote 99).
  18. See the sources earlier. See also Rabbi Nachum Rabinowitz, Melumadei Milchama Responsa, article 68, who writes that it is difficult to rely upon the Aruch HaShulchan to permit this unless one is in extraordinary need, and adds that even according to his methodology, the permit is specifically for weapons that are strapped to one’s body, not a pistol. See also the Torat HaMachane, 2, IDF Chief Rabbinate 5775, pages 256-258 (The sections of Torat HaMachane are available on the IDF Chief Rabbinate’s website, https://bit.ly/4u7N51o). Rabbi Zechariah Ben Shlomo adds that if going out into public domain is needed for a mitzvah, such as for prayer service and the like, there are those who permit carrying it when it is done using two overlapping rabbinic prohibitions (shvut), such as going from private domain to private domain through a karmelit without stopping. One should note that walking without stopping is difficult to implement practically, therefore one should only rely on this in extenuating circumstances.
  19. Mishnah, Yoma 8:6.
  20. Yoma 83a – 85b. From the words of the commentators it arises that the reasoning “and you shall live by them and not die by them” means that one should prevent any minute danger from befalling the Jewish people, see Tosafot, ibid., 85a, ד”ה לפקח: “Rabbeinu Yitzchak says, this is the reason that we do not follow the majority of cases for pikuach nefesh, because it is written ‘and you shall live by them’ and not die by them, that it should not in any case lead to the death of a Jew”. This precise extrapolation is very important in the context of carrying a personal weapon for self-defense on Shabbat, as explained later on.
  21. Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shabbat 2:1-3; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 328:10; Aruch HaShulchan, Orach Chaim, 328:1 6-10; etc. For a clarification of the foundation of this halacha, see Rabbi Yitzchak Shilat, Medicine, Halacha, and the Torah’s Intentions, Ma’aleh Adumim 5774, pages 63-113; Rabbi Re’em HaKohen, ‘Foundations of the Halacha of Pikuach Nefesh on Shabbat’, Golot 3(5755), pages 61-80; Benaya Zaga, ‘Pikuach Nefesh on Shabbat’, VeAderaba BeEidutecha, 1 (5780), pages 85-96.
  22. Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, Kovetz Igrot Chazon Ish, 2:202.
  23. Rabbeinu Yerucham, Toldot Adam VeChava, Nativ 2, part 9. His words are brought verbatim in the Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim, 328:5; this is also the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 328:5: “[for] a non-mortal wound, we consult an expert and the patient; and we do not violate the Shabbat for him, until one of them says that it requires violation or that it becomes life-threatening according to one of them”. See also the commentary of Rabbi Yisrael Isserlein on the Rambam’s commentary on the Mishnah, Berachot 5:1; Noda BeYehuda Responsa, Yoreh Deah, Tinyana, article 210; Chatam Sofer Responsa, Yoreh Deah, article 336. The foundation of this principle is the question of what level of risk is considered life-threatening, see also the Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim, article 316, subarticle 23.
  24. Tzitz Eliezer Responsa, volume 9, article 15 – Meishivat Nefesh, chapter 7.
  25. Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, Chazon Ish, Yoreh Deah, article 208, subarticle 7.
  26. Rabbi Yehoshua Yeshaya Neuwirth, Shmirat Shabbat KeHilchata, Jerusalem 5770, chapter 41, article 31, page 676.
  27. And to grant this additional gravity, according to Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in his definition of potential pikuach nefesh, Minchat Shlomo Responsa, Tinyana, article 37: “and regarding the fundamental aspect of what is called doubtful pikuach nefesh and what is not, and to what extent, I too in my poverty of knowledge was deeply unclear about this, rather it seems to me following logic that anything that most people would flee from as if they were fleeing for their life is considered a doubtful pikuach nefesh and we can apply in the situation ‘and you shall live by them’ and not die by them, however if most people would not be frightened and concerned from it, it is not considered life-threatening”. Considering that on weekdays people carry weapons for self-defense, this rule applies for Shabbat as well. See expanded discourse regarding the opinion of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in Rabbi Tzvi Reisman, Ratz KeTzvi, Actuality in Halacha, volume 3, Los Angeles 5780, article 4, pages 90-113.
  28. Eiruvin 45a.
  29. Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shabbat, chapter 2, halacha 23-24.
  30. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 329:8; Aruch HaShulchan, Orach Chaim, 329:11.
  31. Rabbi Isaac Ben Moshe of Vienna, Or Zarua, volume 2, Hilchot Eiruvin, article 149.
  32. Ibid., Hilchot Shabbat, article 84. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 329:6.
  33. Rabbi Yisrael Rosen, With Trumpets in the House of God (earlier footnote 1), page 113. See the Yalkut Yosef, Shabbat, volume 4, article 329:15: “and based upon the situation nowadays in the Land of Israel, if Arabs enter a Jewish home to steal his money, there is a concern that they will also harm him physically, and therefore one should violate Shabbat in order to save him and call the police”. And in a footnote there he writes – “it is logically obvious that this involves at the very least a doubtful case of threat to life, in light of the situation nowadays”.
  34. Earlier footnote 96, this is also written by Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Meir (earlier footnote 97).
  35. Chazon Ish, article 43:17.
  36. This is also written by the Shmirat Shabbat KeHilchata, chapter 28, article 6, however he adds that if one is accustomed to using the license, such as in times of emergency, it is permissible to carry it.
  37. Yabia Omer Responsa, volume 7, Orach Chaim, article 39:3.
  38. See the Torat HaMachane, 2, pages 261-262.
  39. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 307:5.
  40. Magen Avraham, ibid., subarticle 7. For more discussion see the introduction to the Torat HaMachane in the following footnote, footnote 3 there.
  41. Mahari Angel Responsa, volume 3, article 43, and volume 7, article 20; Shmirat Shabbat KeHilchata, chapter 18, article 22. See the Torat HaMachane, 2, pages 239-240.
  42. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 313:6. See Torat HaMachane, 2, pages 144-146.
  43. See ibid., pages 169-172; Rabbi Michel Rubin, HaMorim BaKeshet, Kiryat Arba-Chevron 5759, pages 119-123.

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